The Global Sociology Blog

Is Russia engaging in a new cold War? One might think so when reading news like this:

BBC NEWS | Europe | Chavez calls for Russia alliance via kwout

Ok, part of this is usual Chavez chest-thumping and posturing. There is nothing new here. It is also clearly a sign of the declining political power of the United States. One has to examine this in the context of a time where President Bush had a good relationship with Vladimir Putin, who, even though he is no longer president, still exercise enormous influence behind the scenes. With this deal, military and economic power are combined to openly defy the influence of the United States.

And what else could remind us of the Cold War?

Oh, I don’t know, maybe Russian military installations in Cuba:

Bombardiers russes à Cuba : les USA mettent la Russie en garde, Amériques – NouvelObs.com via kwout

I know it’s in French but it basically says that US General Norton Schwartz would not like it one bit if Russia was allowed to have a refueling base for its Bear Bombers in Cuba. Why would Russia engage in such a provocation? As a retaliation for the Missile Shield installed in Europe.

So what is exactly going on here? There are clear signs of massive investments in weaponry in Russia. There have been military maneuvers in the Mediterranean. (Click on the image to get a bigger view)

The Russian military is back in business, as Der Spiegel describes,

"According to Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, the head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), "Russia is trying to reestablish a degree of military power that it believes is commensurate with its renewed economic strength and political confidence." And for US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the modernization of the Russian military "underscores the importance of our sustaining a valid nuclear deterrent," in the future, as he told officers in the US Air Force in early June.

This is exactly the kind of language Moscow’s military leaders like to hear. It makes them feel that they are being taken seriously once again. "People don’t like the weak. They don’t listen to them and they insult them. But if we have parity once again, they will be taking a different tone with us," says former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov.

But what does it mean when the military chief of staff in Moscow, responding to US plans to install a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, is back to talking about the "preventive use of nuclear weapons?" When he threatens Georgia and Ukraine, both former Soviet republics, with "military and other measures" should they join NATO? Or when Moscow, as happened in December, suspends its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and calls into question other agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)?

Is this a show of strength for domestic political purposes, designed to bolster patriotic pride among Russians? Is Russia trying to return to the world stage with the tools of the 1970s? Or does the Kremlin truly feel threatened by the West once again?"

It is probably both, of course. Displays of military power are designed for domestic consumption but also for Russia to still throw its weight and maintain its political power in the face of a declining US economic, political, and ideological power (thank you, sociologist Michael Mann for the distinctions), but also taking into account the re-militarization of Japan, the enormous economic and military power of China and the European never-ending attempts at establishing a common defense policy.

According to Stanislav Belkovsky, head of the private Moscow Institute for National Strategy, it is just propaganda.

"According to the dossier, the army has taken delivery on only 90 outdated tanks in the last seven years, all from the country’s only remaining tank factory, in the Ural Mountains region. Experts ridicule the much-touted T-95, which has been talked about for 15 years, as a "fiction." During former President Vladimir Putin’s term in office, the air force received only two new Su-34 fighter-bombers, and the Su-35 fighter jet, unveiled last year as a new model, is in fact a close cousin of an aircraft that was already airborne during former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s first year in office, 1985. According to the Belkovsky report, Russian designers are "no less than 20 years behind their US counterparts in the development of their fifth-generation fighter jets." Only 50 percent of all aircraft and helicopters nationwide are in operation, and the Russian military will experience a shortfall of 4,500 aircraft next year when outdated equipment is removed from service.

The situation is no less dramatic when it comes to nuclear weapons. Under Putin, 405 missiles and 2,498 nuclear warheads were decommissioned, but only 27 new missiles were produced — three times less than under the Yeltsin regime, which was disparaged for being too soft on America. And the shelf life of 80 percent of Russia’s mobile ICBMs expired long ago."

Ok, so there is no need to start investing in nuclear shelters or teach children to duck an cover. The Russian miliatary might be big in size but it’s ineffective and outmoded. However, boasting of a comeback of the big and mighty Russian military managed to start somewhat of an arms race with the United States:

"Citing Moscow’s efforts to modernize, President George W. Bush has asked the US Congress to approve $696 billion (€445 billion) in military spending for the next fiscal year. But the problem with his reasoning is that the Russian threat is nothing but a cheap excuse. (…)

When a country sees itself as the sole remaining superpower, it expects to be able to act as it pleases. The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited the installation of missile defense systems. The START-1 Treaty, which reduces the number of long-range nuclear weapons, expires next year, and another Russian-American treaty to reduce strategic offensive potential will expire in 2012. Moscow’s proposal to replace START-1 with a new treaty has been met with no response from Washington so far. By the time these treaties have all expired, there will no longer be any means of monitoring the enemy’s military activities, including joint inspections, which have helped reduce mutual distrust in the past.

But the Russians are stuck in a vicious circle. To force Washington to agree to new disarmament programs, the Russians must first convince the Americans to take them seriously. The problem is that Washington is no longer impressed by Moscow’s deterrent potential. By the end of 2012, both powers will have between 1,700 and 2,200 nuclear warheads left in their arsenals. But the Russians know that by then no more than 1,000 of their warheads will be serviceable anymore.

Naturally, a power that sees itself as increasingly vulnerable will interpret its rival’s advances as a provocation. America’s plans to install missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, both countries near Russia’s western border, were met with consternation in Moscow, as were the NATO alliance’s advances in Russia’s direction. All across Europe, from the Black Sea to the Baltic, Moscow is now strategically cut off and marginalized."

These missiles installed in Europe are not an actual threat to Russia. They would not be able to intercept a Russian ICBM, but it is the posturing and provocation that matter. And Russia is stuck, between the US, China, Japan and NATO. And with NATO, in particular, things have been tense for the past year over the CSE Treaty:

"Tensions between NATO and the former states of the Soviet Union reached a new climax last weekend, following Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CSE). (…)

The CSE treaty—negotiated in 1990 and ratified by 22 states in 1992—put an end to the post-war standoff between Washington and its allies, on the one side, and the Stalinist-ruled former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc allies, on the other. It set upper limits on the number of conventional weapons (tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters) that could be stationed on European soil. The result was a cutback in the big defensive armies assembled on both sides of the former Iron Curtain and their replacement by much smaller, more modern strike forces designed for worldwide intervention. (…)

A revised CSE treaty (ACSE) was concluded in Istanbul in 1999 by a total of 30 states, but this treaty has only been ratified by Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

The NATO states delayed any ratification, arguing that first Russia must withdraw its troops stationed in rebel provinces of Georgia and Moldavia. Moscow, however, denies that agreement on the withdrawal of its troops from Georgia and Moldavia was ever a firm part of the ACSE agreement.

The NATO states’ refusal to ratify the ACSE agreement is now being used by Russia to justify its own decision to quit the CSE treaty."

And let us not forget that Russia is also flexing its economic muscle on the gas front when it comes to Europe.

Obviously, it does not make sense to speak of a Cold War in a multipolar world. The Cold War context revolved around the competition between the two superpowers. However, a multipolar world presents many opportunities for tensions and frictions, provocations and misunderstanding (in other words, risks again). Nation-states are embedded in a variety of regional contexts that they have to negotiate with whatever resources at their disposal to assert their power and interests. That is what Russia is doing. However, it is enough to generate potential conflicts at different levels.

This is where mechanisms of global governance are put to the test. And as the arrest of Karadzic yesterday demonstrates, so far, these mechanisms have not been very efficient.